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I.   STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 
Pursuant to U.C.A. ' 78-2a-3(2)(j), and the Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, ' 3, this 
 
Court has jurisdiction over the present appeal.   
 
II.   STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
A.  Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below 
 
The case is a sheriff’s sale/redemption dispute.  Appellants J. Bond and Dorius are 
former lawyers for Appellee Pyper and obtained a judgment against Appellee for unpaid 
legal fees.  J. Bond and Dorius instituted a sheriff’s sale of Pyper’s real property.  Upon 
completion of the sale, they transferred some of their interest in the real property to 
Appellant A. Bond.  However, Pyper disputed the sale based on, among other things, 
gross inadequacy of the purchase price and irregularities during the six-month redemption 
period.
This case was tried before Sixth District Court Judge David Mower on June 23, 
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2008.  After a day-long evidentiary hearing, Judge Mower took the matter under 
advisement.  In his September 2, 2008 Memorandum Decision (Including Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law) Judge Mower set aside Appellants’ sheriff sale.  He signed 
and entered the final order in this case on October 16, 2008.  The present appeal is taken 
from said ruling.   
B.  Pyper’s Response to Appellants= Statement of Facts Section 
 
Appellants attempt to set forth a number of factual allegations in the Statement of 
Facts section of their appeal brief.   However, their factual allegations are irrelevant and 
inapplicable because Appellants do not in any way challenge the Trial Court’s findings of 
fact.  Specifically, and fatal to any appellate challenge to the Trial Court’s findings, 
Appellants’ Statement of Facts section completely fails to marshal evidence from the trial 
transcript in support of the Trial Court=s findings of fact and conclusions of law.  This 
failure to marshal is more thoroughly discussed in the Argument section below. 
Accordingly, the Trial Court’s findings of fact govern over any facts asserted by 
Appellants. 
C.  Pyper=s Statement of Material Facts 
 
Because the Trial Court’s findings of fact govern this appeal, Pyper restates the 
Trial Court’s salient findings of fact from its Memorandum Decision: 
1. Pyper incurred attorney’s fees to J. Bond in the amount of $9,064.82, 
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which Pyper failed to pay.  [R. at 415, &¶ 3-4] 
2. J. Bond filed an action to collect his attorney’s fees, resulting in a March 
1, 2006 judgment of $10,577.23 against Pyper.  [R. at 414, &¶5-6] 
3. J. Bond then obtained a Writ of Execution to collect on the judgment, 
and levied against real property owned by Pyper.  [R. at 414, &¶7-8] 
4. Pyper’s real property is a 1,500 – 1,600 square foot house on a one-half 
acre lot valued in the range of $125,000 to $127,764.  [R. at 414, &9] 
5. A sheriff’s sale occurred on November 9, 2006 whereat J. Bond was the 
only bidder.  [R. at 414, &¶10-12] 
6. J. Bond successfully bid $329, which was the only bid on the property.  
[R. at 414-413, &¶13-16] 
7. J. Bond did not pay any cash for the property because the sale price of 
$329 was less than the $10,577.23 judgment.  [R. at 413, &17] 
8. At the time there were several liens on the property, which Pyper was 
able to clear off in April 2007.  [R. at 413, &19] 
9. Even assuming there was still a $50,000 mortgage on the property, based 
on the $125,000 - $127,764 value of the property, there was $75,000 - 
$77,764 equity in the property, which J. Bond bought for $329.  [R. at 
408] 
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10. Pyper desired to redeem the property from the Sheriff’s sale.  [R. at 413, 
&20] 
11. On April 20, 2007, Pyper called J. Bond and Dorius’s law firm, Dorius, 
Bond, Reyes & Linares, asking for a judgment lien pay-off.  [R. at 413, 
&21] 
12. He was unable to speak with an attorney, but was told the firm would 
call him back.  [R. at 413, &22] 
13. No one called Pyper back.  However, on April 25, 2007 Pyper made 
another phone call to the law firm and spoke with Dorius.  [R. at 413, 
&23] 
14. Although Dorius and Pyper have conflicting accounts of the April 25, 
2007 conversation, Dorius told Pyper he needed to talk to J. Bond about 
it.  [R. at 413-412, &¶24-25] 
15. Thereafter, Pyper called Dorius’s office every day, making 
approximately 28 phone calls.  [R. at 412, &26] 
16. Pyper explained that he called the law firm so many times in order to 
obtain a pay-off amount because he did not know the exact amount, and 
thought that some interest might have been added to the original amount. 
 [R. at 410, &44] 
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17. On May 16, 2007, a Sheriff’s Deed was issued transferring the property 
to Bond.  [R. at 412, &27] 
18. On May 17, 2007, Pyper called J. Bond and told him that Pyper had 
money to pay off the judgment.  [R. at 412, &¶28-29] 
19. J. Bond told Pyper that J. Bond and Dorius needed to get together and 
figure out the amount of the pay-off, and that he would call Pyper back.  
[R. at 411, &¶30-32] 
20. J. Bond never called Pyper back.  [R. at 411, &33] 
21. Pyper kept calling Dorius and Bond until May 30, 2007, calling them 
almost every day.  [R. at 411, &36] 
22. On May 30, 2007, Pyper called his attorney, Bryan Quesenberry, for help 
in obtaining the pay-off amount.  [R. at 411, &37] 
23. That same day, Quesenberry called Dorius to ask for a pay-off amount.  
[R. at 411, &38] 
24. Dorius told Quesenberry that Dorius would call him back by end of the 
week, but never called Quesenberry back.  [R. at 411, &¶39-40] 
IV.   SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
Appellants do not challenge any of the Trial Court’s findings of fact.  If they did, 
they would have had to marshal evidence in support of the Trial Court’s decision, which 
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they failed to do.  Thus, the Trial Court’s findings of fact govern this appeal. 
Substantively, Appellants’ appeal is without merit because Appellants completely 
overlook Utah cases interpreting Rule 69C which highly disfavor sheriff=s sales that 
involve inadequacy of price, appearance of impropriety, unfairness and fraud.   
Such is exactly the reason Pyper brought the action below to set aside Appellants’ 
sheriff=s sale.  Specifically, J. Bond and Dorius, both attorneys, set up a sheriff=s sale 
where J. Bond was the only bidder and bid $329 for Pyper=s property which was appraised 
at least $125,000.  Not only is this gross inadequacy of price a sufficient basis for the 
Court to set aside this sheriff=s sale, but also J. Bond and Dorius’s misleading phone 
messages and communications to Pyper and Quesenberry before and after the expiration 
of the redemption period support Pyper=s claim of impropriety, and amply justify the Trial 
Court in setting aside the sheriff=s sale in question. 
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V.   ARGUMENT 
 
A.  APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHAL FACTS AND EVIDENCE 
IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT=S DECISION, AND THUS 
CANNOT CHALLENGE ANY OF THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS OF 
FACT 
 
When challenging a finding of fact, appellate courts refuse to address the challenge 
unless the appellant has properly marshaled the evidence.  See, Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 
425, 433-34 (Utah 1998); Witear v. Labor Comm=n, 973 P.2d 982, 985 (Utah App. 1998). 
 “To successfully attack the verdict, an appellant must marshal all the evidence 
supporting the verdict and then demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is insufficient to support it.”  Martinez v. 
Wells, 88 P.3d 343, 349 (Utah App. 2004) (citations omitted; emphasis added).   
When the appellant fails to properly marshal facts, “the court of appeals must 
assume that the record supports the findings of the trial court.”  Eggett v. Wasatch Energy 
Corp., 2004 UT 28, & 10 (citation omitted); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 
(Utah 1998); Johnson v. Higley, 977 P.2d 1209, 1218 (Utah App. 1999).  If the evidence 
is properly marshaled, appellant then must show that the marshaled evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the challenged findings when viewing the evidence and inferences 
in a light most favorable to the decision.  Child, 972 P.2d at 433; Johnson, 977 P.2d at 
1217. 
In the present case, the Trial Court issued 46 detailed findings of fact, covering a 
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full day of trial testimony and numerous exhibits.  Despite this, Appellants have failed to 
marshal any evidence in support of the Trial Court=s findings and conclusions.  Instead, 
Appellants attempt to provide this Court a whole new set of facts from hearing testimony 
and exhibits which were not part of the Court’s findings of fact, and then argue from their 
set of facts that the Trial Court’s decision should be reversed.   
Thus, the issue before the Court is whether the facts found by the Trial Court 
satisfy the applicable law under an abuse of discretion standard. 
B.  THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION 
 
 Citing Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777 (Utah 1992), Appellants urge the Court to 
review the Trial Court’s decision for correctness.  However, Trujillo dealt with the issue 
of “[w]hether a landowner owes a duty of care to another [which] is a question of law.”  
Id. at 778.  The Trujillo court gave “no deference to the trial court's ruling but review[ed] 
it for correctness.”  Id. at 778-79.  This is the incorrect standard of review. 
 The correct standard of review is abuse of discretion, according to Huston v. 
Lewis, 818 P.2d 531, 534 (Utah 1991).  Huston is one of the three seminal cases 
applicable to the Trial Court’s decision and this appeal, and is discussed below.  In 
Huston, the court held that expanding the redemption period is discretionary: 
We have stated that in appropriate circumstances, a court may enlarge a 
redemption period under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6(2).  Rule 6(2) provides, 
‘When by these rules . . .  an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a 
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specific time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion . . . order 
the period enlarged . . . .”  Since rule 6(2) clearly grants the court discretion, we 
review the court’s decision for an abuse of that discretion. 
 
See also, Dugan v. Jones, 724 P.2d 955, 956 (Utah 1986) (holding, “In this proceeding in 
equity, this Court is free to review both the facts and the law as found and applied by the 
trial court, but will not disturb the trial court's findings of facts unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates against them.”).  State in Interest of H., 610 P.2d 849, 852 (Utah 1980) 
(citation omitted) (holding, “In equity proceedings we are charged with the responsibility 
of reviewing the evidence; and it is the established rule that we will not disturb the 
findings and determination made unless they are clearly against the weight of the 
evidence, or the court has abused its discretion”); Watson v. Watson, 561 P.2d 1072, 
1074 (Utah 1977) (holding “when it is made to appear that the court has failed to 
correctly apply principles of law or equity, or that the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the findings, or that the judgment has so failed to do equity that it manifests a 
clear abuse of discretion, a court on review will take appropriate corrective action in the 
interests of justice.”)   
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C.  SUBSTANTIVELY, THIS APPEAL FAILS BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT=S RULING THAT THE SHERIFF’S SALE SHOULD BE SET 
ASIDE WAS A REASONABLE DECISION 
 
Appellants= argument on appeal is that the Trial Court’s findings of fact 
inadequately satisfy the Trial Court=s legal conclusion that the sheriff’s sale should be set 
aside.  In other words, Appellants do not challenge the Trial Court’s findings.  Appellants 
simply challenge application of the findings to the law.   
Analysis of the applicable law begins with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69C 
which governs redeeming sheriff=s sale.  It requires, among other things, that Athe 
redemptioner [Pyper] shall pay the amount required to the purchaser [Bond]. . .@  Rule 
69C(c).  In determining the Aamount required,@ Pyper (without counsel) called Bond and 
his counsel, Dorius (both attorneys) no less than 28 times (before and after the expiration 
of the redemption period) to determine the full payoff of the Judgment.  Both before and 
after expiration of the redemption period, attorneys Bond and Dorius repeatedly told 
Pyper they would call him back with a payoff amount.  Further, after the expiration of the 
180 days, Dorius told Pyper=s counsel, Quesenberry, that Dorius would provide 
Quesenberry with a payoff amount by the end of the following week (which would have 
been June 8th).   
The Court=s inquiry, however, does not end with Rule 69C.  Utah caselaw 
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interpreting Rule 69C also applies to this case.  A number of Utah courts, based on 
principles of equity, have allowed redemption petitions to proceed notwithstanding 
expiration of the redemption period. 
In United States v. Loosley, 551 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah 1976), the court held, 
“Foreclosure is in the nature of a forfeiture, which the law does not favor, and therefore, 
rules and statutes dealing with redemption are remedial in character and should be given 
a liberal construction.” (Emphasis added).  In Mollerup v. Storage Systems International, 
569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977), the court held:   
a court, sitting in equity, may in appropriate instances extend the [redemption] 
period.  This Court has recognized that equitable principle by setting aside a sale 
after the time for redemption had expired, when the sale was attended by such 
substantial irregularities as must have prevented a sale at a fair sum, resulting in 
a gross sacrifice of the judgment creditor=s property.  A similar case can be made 
to relieve a mortgagor of the consequences of fraud, accident, mistake, or waiver . 
. . 
 
Id. at 1124 (emphasis added) (citing Young v. Schroeder, 37 P. 252 (Utah 1894)).  In 
Young, a case with striking similarities to the present case, the court sustained a trial 
court=s ruling that voided a sheriff=s sale due to gross inadequacy of price and sale 
irregularities which led to the sacrifice of the debtor=s property.  Specifically, the creditor 
in Young obtained a default judgment against the debtor for $1,673.36.  Id. at 252.  The 
creditor then executed on the debtor=s real property, which was worth $25,000.  Id.  The 
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attorneys attaching and levying on the property told the debtor that they would not insist 
on the statutory time for redemption.  Id. at 253.  Relying thereon, the debtor allowed the 
redemption period to expire.  Id.  Further, the same attorneys attaching and levying on the 
property also purchased the property at the sheriff=s sale.  Id. at 255.  In reviewing these 
facts, the Young court held: 
wherever the court perceives that a sale of property has been made at a grossly 
inadequate price, such as would shock a correct mind, this inadequacy furnishes a 
strong, and, in general, a conclusive, presumption, though there be no direct proof 
of fraud, that an undue advantage has been taken of the ignorance, weakness, or 
the distress or necessity of the vendor; and this imposes on the purchaser a 
necessity to remove this violent presumption by the clearest evidence of fairness of 
his conduct.   
 
(Emphasis added).  Id.  The Young court was so appalled by the sacrifice of the debtor=s 
property that it quoted the United States Supreme Court: “We may say, with the supreme 
court of the United States in the case of Byers v. Surget, infra: ‘It seems pertinent here to 
inquire under what system of civil polity, under what code of law or ethics, a transaction 
like that disclosed by the record in this case can be excused, or even palliated.’”  Id. at 
254.   
Further, the Young court disapprovingly viewed the creditor=s attorneys= 
participation in the purchase of the property at the sheriff=s sale: “A purchase by an 
attorney for his own benefit at a sale over which he has exercised any direction or control 
  16 
should always be closely scrutinized by the court. [Citation omitted].  ‘Public policy and 
the analogies of the law require that they should be considered per se as in the twilight 
between legal fraud and fairness, and should be deemed fraudulent, or in trust for the 
debtor, upon slight additional facts.’”  Id. at 255-6 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 Finally, Appellants claim that Young required “substantial irregularities” in the 
creditor’s conduct in presuming fraud.  Appellants misapprehend Young.  The Young 
court requires only “slight circumstances of unfairness”: 
if the inadequacy of price is so gross as to shock the conscience, or if, in addition 
to gross inadequacy, the purchaser has been guilty of any unfairness, or has taken 
any undue advantage, or if the owner of the property or party interested has been 
for any other reason misled or surprised, then the sale will be regarded as 
fraudulent and void, or the party injured will be permitted to redeem the property 
sold.  Great inadequacy requires only slight circumstances of unfairness in the 
conduct of the party benefited by the sale to raise the presumption of fraud.   
 
Id. at 254.  Young was discussed in detail and reaffirmed in Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 
531, 535-6 (Utah 1991).  In reaffirming Young, the Huston court cited four key facts from 
Young:  
We relied on the following facts: [1] Land worth $26,000 was sold to satisfy a 
judgment of $1,700, [2] the purchasers were the attorneys for the judgment debtor, 
[3] the purchasers directed the land to be sold in parcels in a manner that prevented 
the land from being sold at a fair price, and [4] the purchasers assured the debtor 
that they would not insist on the statutory period for redemption. 
 
Id. at 536 (citing Young, 37 P. at 254-56). 
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The present case is no different from Young and mirrors three of the four Young 
facts cited in Huston.  As noted above, the person who bought the property at the sale B J. 
Bond B was the judgment-creditor and the attorney setting up the sheriff=s sale.  Further, J. 
Bond was the sole bidder at the sheriff=s sale and purchased the property at the sheriff=s 
sale for $329 B a property appraised at approximately $125,000.  To put this into 
perspective, Bond bought the property for 0.25% of its value.  Or, in other words, J. Bond 
made a profit of 37,994% on the purchase.  Not only did J. Bond obtain the property for a 
song, but he credit bid only $329 of the $10,577.23 Judgment, leaving more than $10,000 
still owing on the judgment.  If the conscience of the Young court was shocked by the 
gross inadequacy of price (paying $1,673.36 for real property worth $25,000) and thus 
found the attorney-purchaser guilty of unfairness and undue advantage, the Trial Court 
too was justifiably shocked at attorneys J. Bond and Dorius obtaining Pyper’s $125,000 
property for $329. 
In addition to this great inadequacy of price, circumstances of unfairness also 
surrounded the expiration of the redemption period.  Appellants intentionally misled 
Pyper during the redemption period by promising to return Pyper=s many phone calls and 
by promising to give him the payoff amount B just long enough for the redemption period 
to expire.  Even after the redemption period expired, they mislead Pyper by promising 
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they would call him back with a payoff, and also promising his attorney, Quesenberry, a 
forth-coming payoff.  As the Young court and the United States Supreme Court indicated 
above, under what system of civil polity, under what code of law or ethics, can a 
transaction like that disclosed in the present case be excused, or even palliated? 
As noted above, the applicable appellate standard of review in this case is abuse of 
discretion.  “Abuse of discretion means that the trial court's ruling is "beyond the limits of 
reasonability."  State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 456 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted).  The 
Trial Court’s decision in this case was eminently reasonable. 
Not only does the Trial Court’s decision reverse the give-away of Pyper’s property 
by invalidating the sheriff’s sale, it still allows Appellants an opportunity to conduct 
another sheriff’s sale.  The Trial Court did not dissolve Appellants’ judgment lien on 
Pyper’s property.  Nor did it invalidate Appellants right to foreclose Pyper’s property.  
Now, though, if this Court affirms the Trial Court, Pyper will be able to obtain a payoff of 
the judgment, pay it, and thus obviate the need for a sheriff’s sale.  This way, Appellants 
get paid on their judgment and Pyper does not sacrifice his property for nothing.  Such a 
result is clearly reasonable.  Indeed, it would be hard to find a more reasonable decision. 
D.  APPELLANTS’ NARROW DEFINITION OF “SHERIFF’S SALE” AS 
CONSTITUTING ONLY THE ACTUAL SALE ACTION BY THE 
SHERIFF IGNORES THE EQUITABLE PRINCIPALS APPLIED IN THIS 
APPEAL 
 
Appellants argue on appeal that the Trial Court misapplied Young.  Specifically, 
Appellants assert that the irregularities found by the Trial Court did not pertain to the 
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actual sale conducted by the sheriff, but instead occurred during the redemption period.  
According to Appellants’ view of Young, irregularities at the actual sheriff’s sale held on 
November 9, 2006 can be considered, but irregularities occurring during the subsequent 
redemption period are irrelevant and not to be considered.  
Appellants misunderstand and misstate Young.  The irregularities found by the 
Young court did not solely pertain to the actual auction conducted by the sheriff at the 
sheriff’s sale.   
First, the creditors in Young misled and misrepresented to the debtor after the 
actual sheriff sales (there were three) that the creditors would not enforce the six-month 
statutory redemption period:  
after said several sales had been made, and before the time for redemption had 
expired, Stephens informed the plaintiff that the statutory time for redemption 
would not be insisted upon, that the plaintiff, believing and relying upon such 
promise and assurance, allowed the period for redemption to elapse without 
redeeming any of said property from said sales . . . 
 
Id. at 253 (emphasis added).  Second, the creditors were attorneys, thus requiring special 
scrutiny of their conduct.  Id. at 254 (“an additional feature of the transaction is that 
Stephens & Schroeder were members of the bar, attorneys for the judgment creditors, 
who thus, under the forms of law and the processes of the court, sought to enrich 
themselves without any consideration for the rights of the judgment debtor . . .”); see also 
255-56. 
 Third, one of the three main cases cited and quoted by the Young court in support 
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of its ruling referenced improprieties that occurred during the redemption period.  In 
Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180, 182 (1886), after the actual sheriff’s sale, the 
judgment-creditor Graffam “and the other defendants meanwhile conspired together to 
keep [debtor] in ignorance of the [sheriff’s] sale until the year, allowed by the statutes of 
Massachusetts for redeeming the property, had expired.”  Thus, the Graffam court 
considered post-sale irregularities, just as the Young court did. 
Finally, a Rule 69B sheriff’s sale is clearly governed by Rule 69C’s six-month 
right of redemption.  Although Appellants are keen to arbitrarily prohibit equity from 
apply to any conduct after the Rule 69B sheriff’s sale (the actual auction), they provide no 
legal support for drawing such an arbitrary black-letter line.  Appellants argue that equity, 
as invoked in Young, Huston and Mollerup, only applies to the actual sheriff’s sale, and 
not to Appellants’ conduct during the subsequent redemption period.   
Although Appellants are loathe to expand the reach of equity, but quick to restrict 
it, caselaw views equity differently.  Equity is defined as “fairness” or the “body of 
principles constituting what is fair and right.” Black’s Law Diction 443 (7th Ed. 2000). 
“The purpose of an equity action is to restore the parties to the status quo to the extent 
possible.”  Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1984).  “It is inherent in the nature 
and purpose of equity that it will grant relief only when fairness and good conscience so 
demand.  Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976).  Another purpose of 
equity “is the prevention of injustice . . .”  Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Rite Way Concrete 
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Forming, 742 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah 1987).   
Arbitrarily truncating the application of equity right after the actual sheriff’s sale 
defeats the purpose of reviewing this case through the eyes of equity.  Because the 
purpose of equity is to do what is fair, right and just, logically its application should occur 
from the time a sheriff’s sale is first noticed through the six-month redemption period.  To 
exclude conduct of the parties during the six-month redemption period is to emasculate 
equity’s review of Appellants’ conduct for no legal, logical or rational reason. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the Trial Court=s decision and 
deny the appeal in its entirety. 
 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of March, 2009. 
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                       _______/s/__________________________ 
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